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Good Afternoon. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to speak 
to you today. I must say that it was mighty generous of Cal Grayson to 
invite a resident from Big Orange Country to the home of the Big Blue. 
The trip up here normally isn't so pleasant for us Tennesseans. I guess 
since it is not basketball season yet, though, I can go back with my 
dignity intact. Seriously, though, it is always a pleasure to be here. 
When Mr. Grayson called and asked me to address this session, I 
asked him what the themes were. He responded that the overall confer-
ence theme was Transportation Partners for Quality and that this 
session specifically focused on intermodalism. Now, I have been in 
academia for four years, but before that I spent seven years in logistics 
management, and the terms quality, partnership, and intermodal were 
mutually exclusive terms. The transportation world is indeed changing, 
and now you can't do business without considering each of these ele-
ments. 
Let me begin with the following definitions: 
-Multimodalism is the process of considering all modes of 
transportation. 
-Intermodalism is the process oflooking at linkages, interactions, 
and movements between transportation modes. 
In this country, we have long taken a multimodal approach in both 
the public and private sectors, although our consideration leans rather 
more heavily towards some modes than others. Private sector consider-
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ation ofintermodalism is nothing really new. Intermodal transportation 
has been practiced in various forms for many years. It is the public 
sector promotion ofintermodalism that is really coming on strong. 
The passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
(!STEA) in 1991 did more than anything else in recent years to raise 
intermodalism in the consciousness of the public sector transportation 
community. The stated goal of ISTEA is to: 
" ... develop a National lntermodal Transportation System that is 
economically efficient, environmentally sound, provides the foundation 
for the nation to compete in the global economy and will move people and 
goods in an energy-efficient manner ... " 
The Act makes the improvement of intermodal connections a major 
federal aim. It created an Office of Intermodalism in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation, and it outlined, among other things, the require-
ment for state governments to develop intermodal management systems. 
There are real opportunities for the public sector to coordinate the 
interests of public/private interests, resolve land use and zoning issues, 
and to assess the economic, environmental, and traffic impacts of 
intermodalism. 
lntermodalism has many possible implementations for freight, 
including rail-highway, rail-barge, rail-ocean vessel, truck-barge, truck-
ocean vessel, and truck-air. (Passenger intermodalism has exciting 
possibilities in the air-high speed rail area, and is no less important in 
!STEA, but I will confine my remarks to freight transportation.) The 
current emphasis in intermodalism focuses on combinations of the rail, 
highway, and ocean vessel modes. 
lntermodal transportation is, almost by definition, a partnership. In 
the United States, unlike other countries (such as Canada), transporta-
tion companies have a limited degree of horizontal integration. There-
fore, intermodal movements traditionally involve two or more transpor-
tation providers. In rail-highway moves, for example, an intermodal 
move might involve a third party marketer, a drayage company for 
pickup and delivery, and one or more railroads for the line haul. These 
firms should all be partners, since they are working towards the common 
goal of selling and providing a service. Unfortunately, traditional inter-
modal partnerships often demonstrated little marital bliss. 
In today's commercial environment, where quality is becoming a 
watchword, partnership is being taken considerably further than the 
above example indicates. To compete globally, U.S. firms must provide a 
quality product at a competitive cost. To accomplish this, manufacturers 
are tightly integrating transportation providers into their production 
processes. The service providers are becoming true partners in the 
production and distribution of the end product. At the same time, and 
perhaps because of this, the intermodal players are seeking to forge true 
partnerships which exploit the strengths of each firm. There are now, as 
a result of ISTEA, opportunities for the public sector to help forge and to 
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participate in these partnerships. I plan, during my talk, to explore each 
of these trends in more detail. First, however, I'd like to give some 
background on the intermodal environment and illustrate how we have 
arrived at the current status. 
Rail-highway and rail-vessel intermodal services have been around 
for many years. The railroads have hauled highway trucks since at least 
the 1920s, although trailer-on-flat-car (TOFC) service volume was first 
widely offered during the 1950s and 1960s. Similarly, railroad container-
on-flat-car (COFC) dates from early in the century. Unlike TOFC, COFC 
volumes remained relatively small in the U.S. until the 1970s. The direct 
transfer of commodities in bulk between rail cars and ocean vessels has 
been conducted since the early years of rail transportation. 
Railroad TOFC service was developed in an attempt to reverse the 
loss of high value freight to motor carriers. The railroads offered 14 
different "plans" for traditional TOFC service. These generally varied in 
the details of which party provided the highway equipment and per-
formed pick-up and delivery functions. During the boom years ofTOFC 
growth, the railroads constructed hundreds of terminals nationwide to 
handle the loading and unloading of trailers from rail cars. These were 
often small facilities without much mechanized equipment, relatively 
poor access to the highway system, and little area for equipment storage. 
As such, they were relatively inefficient and costly to operate. 
A key element of TOFC marketing was the cost differential between 
it and motor carrier truckload service. The railroads sought to recapture 
their market share by undercutting motor carrier pricing. The construc-
tion of the Interstate Highway System provided the trucking industry 
with the opportunity to greatly improve service levels. At the same time, 
the rail physical plant was deteriorating as the railroads faced extreme 
financial pressures. Motor carrier management frankly outperformed 
rail management by identifying opportunities, solving service problems, 
maintaining high customer service standards, and marketing their 
product. Increasingly, shippers equated motor carrier service with 
premium transportation and willingly paid the higher rates. 
The broker was an integral element of traditional intermodal trans-
portation. Brokers operated off the margin obtained by consolidating 
shipments to TOFC level, building sufficient volume to get more favor-
able rates, or by providing value added services such as drayage. In 
effect, brokers served as a TOFC marketing arm for the railroad. Sel-
dom, if ever, did brokers provide or own any of the equipment involved 
in intermodal operations. When performed by reputable firms, brokering 
performed a valuable function and helped to build volume. Unfortu-
nately, brokers were sometimes dishonest, financially unstable, incompe-
tent, or otherwise unable to perform. The few bad actors tainted the 
waters for many shippers who would have otherwise used TOFC. 
Railroad operations involving TOFC often left much to be desired. 
Railroads frequently attempted to operate TOFC equipment in regular 
90 
"loose car" train service. This resulted in unacceptable loss and damage 
as cars were switched in yards and greatly enhanced transit times over 
truck competition. To use TOFC service, shippers were required to use 
special trailers (always in short supply) and to block and brace cargo to 
withstand the rigors of rail handling. The railroads could never seem to 
find your load in their system when you called for a trace. As a shipper, 
you had to deal with the broker and his bill and the railroad and its bill. 
It was always hard to figure out how much the shipment cost. Shippers 
faced a real battle in trying to file and collect claims for their frequently 
damaged or lost shipments. It is little wonder that motor carrier sales 
forces had it so easy. 
The railroad TOFC plans attracted rather low valued commodities 
which were not time sensitive. The railroad industry seemed unable to 
recognize that service had value. By the early 1980s, rail intermodal 
profits were widely considered to be marginal at best, and the railroads 
continued to lose market share in many intermodal corridors. There 
were some intermodal success stories. United Parcel Service (UPS) made 
extensive use of intermodal to handle its small parcel service. UPS was 
successful in this because it tendered large volumes, sufficient in many 
cases for dedicated trains and certainly large enough in any case to gain 
leverage with rail management. A few major railroads, such as Conrail 
and Santa Fe, counted on intermodal for such a large revenue share that 
they actively solicited the business and sought to provide and sell ser-
vice. This worked well as long as the entire movement was internal to 
their systems, but once a shipment was interlined to another rail carrier, 
they had no control over the service levels. 
Obviously, from this synopsis, you might gather that there were a 
number of players-railroads, brokers, shippers, drayage firms, etc.--with 
vested interests in intermodal transportation. Yet, each seemed to 
function according to its own self-interest, and there was little true 
partnership. What happened to change this? 
In 1980, Congress passed the Staggers Rail Act, which greatly 
deregulated the rail industry. Staggers gave the railroads more freedom 
in pricing and the ability to offer contract rates. The Motor Carrier Act of 
1980 relaxed entry requirements for the trucking industry. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission followed with a series of rulings largely 
deregulating TOFC rates. 
These rulings had a dramatic effect on the ailroads and motor 
carriers. U oder the freedoms accorded by Staggers, the U.S. railroad 
industry had record revenues during the 1980s. The carriers used these 
revenues to implement extensive capital improvement programs to 
upgrade and rehabilitate their physical plant and equipment. At the 
same time, they downsized by eliminating excess plant and slimming 
their labor force. The railroads succeeded, through negotiation, in 
reducing labor requirements and in effectively cutting costs. By the mid-
1980s, many analysts felt that the U.S. rail system was at an all time 
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peak condition. Even so, rail market share continued to decline, although 
absolute tonnage levels reached record levels. 
For the motor carriers, on the other hand, deregulation offered 
mixed blessings. The relaxing of restrictions on market entry and pricing 
fostered fierce competition. Many old line trucking companies disap-
peared from the scene. A general decline in highway conditions along 
with increased congestion whittled away at motor carrier service levels. 
A national driver shortage raised the price of labor, and fuel prices rose 
throughout the decade. The carriers were able to use increases in pro-
ductivity gained from increased vehicle sizes to partially offset cost 
increases. 
Without a doubt, cost pressures contributed to a first wave of inter-
modal volume increases in the 1980s. Economic slumps in the early 
1980s made shippers more cost conscious. In response, traffic was 
diverted to the lower cost intermodal alternative. With the increased 
ability of the railroads to provide service, some traffic remained in 
intermodal service. Fuel price increases also increased the cost advan-
tage ofintermodal. Fuel represents 8-10 percent of operating costs for 
rail intermodal verses 15-20 percent for motor carriers. Increased fuel 
costs therefore tend to shift traffic to intermodal service. 
The first new wave of intermodal partnerships was initiated by the 
steamship lines. Faced with a tidal wave of inbound import traffic as a 
result of the U.S. trade deficit, these lines looked toward rail intermodal 
to move containers from their vessels to market areas deep within U.S. 
borders. Vessel lines used COFC to landbridge container traffic from port 
to port across the continent. This traffic had a domestic leg, however, 
and furthermore, the containers had to be returned to the port for return 
to the overseas point of origin for reloading. 
To handle their traffic at competitive costs, the vessel lines adapted 
the double stack platform, an innovation introduced by the Southern 
Pacific Railroad. Double stacking containers significantly increased 
COFC productivity, offering as much as a 40 percent cost advantage over 
single stack operations. This was important, since the long inland hauls 
placed the vessel lines at a cost disadvantage. 
The steamship lines looked at their empty container backhaul and 
decided to solicit domestic freight to cover their costs. To their surprise, 
the domestic freight volumes soon became extremely lucrative. The 
railroad company operated the trains, while.the vessel operators mar-
keted the service and provided all support services to the customer 
(billing, tracing, etc.). Despite concerns that double stack services com-
peted with their traditional TOFC business and that they were being 
pressured to accept unreasonably low rates, the railroads found the 
traffic volumes offered by the vessel lines too attractive to resist. 
By the late 1980s, vessel lines had entered into numerous partner-
ships with railroads to provide double-stack services. Companies such as 
American President Lines, Mitsui OSK, NYK Lines, and SeaLand were 
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operating double-stack services in conjunction with various railroads. 
These were true partnerships. 
The case of American President Companies (APC) is illustrative. 
APC entered the double-stack market to assist its vessel line (APL) 
which served Pacific Coast ports. APC planned to use rail to reach inland 
markets, many of which could be more cheaply reached by an all water 
move. The company decided to use dedicated rail service to provide a 
premium service for which shippers would pay higher rates. It developed 
close working relationships with selected rail carriers to ensure that 
strict performance standards were met. APC purchased several inter-
modal brokers to solicit backhaul freight. 
APC's partnership with the railroads focused on a joint approach to 
shipper problems. APC personnel were assigned in a liaison role to the 
railroad terminals. Dedicated staff at headquarters coordinated line-haul 
activities with railroad management. APC managed all terminal opera-
tions; the railroad simply operated the container trains. APC provided 
railroads financial assistance for clearance improvement projects neces-
sary to handle the double-stack equipment. The Union Pacific Railroad 
proposed to drop all conventional TOFC service in favor of APC managed 
COFC service. 
A second interrnodal partnership relationship has sprung up between 
major Interrnodal Marketing Companies (IMC), the vogue term for 
brokers, and the railroads. The major railroads have long been concerned 
by the problems associated with poor IMC performance, yet have de-
pended upon the ability of these companies to generate intermodal 
business. This need has become more acute as railroads have downsized 
and centralized their own sales and marketing departments. The rail-
roads have therefore tended recently to seek relationships with a se-
lected number of reputable IMCs. In return, the IMCs have become more 
insistent upon quality performance from the railroads upon which to 
base their marketing efforts. 
The third interrnodal provider relationship, and perhaps the one 
which offers the greatest possibility for realizing the ultimate potential 
for intermodal freight, is that between motor carriers and railroads. 
Such is the potential of these relationships that the 1990s has been 
termed the decade of intermodalism. These partnerships should take 
advantage of the strengths of each participant: 
-Low cost, high productivity long haul capability of the railroad 
-Local pick-up/delivery capability of the motor carrier 
-Marketing and customer service expertise of the motor carrier 
It is refreshing that motor carriers and railroads, long bitter rivals, 
should be cooperating rationally in the 1990s. From the standpoints of 
both modes, there are strong economic reasons why these partnerships 
are sensible . 
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At first glance, railroad intermodal growth has been impressive in 
terms of volume. Consider that 1992 lifts exceeded 6.7 million, a better 
than 100 percent increase over 1980 volumes, and a 7.4 percent over 
1991 levels. Almost 50 percent of these lifts were double-stacked. Yet, 
intermodal captures only 3-4 percent of total intercity freight move-
ments. In terms of the truckload market (500+ miles), intermodal does 
somewhat better, with an estimated 15 percent share. The railroads have 
had difficulty in overcoming on their own the image of intermodal traffic 
as a low cost, low quality alternative to motor carrier service. This has 
left them with the low rated moves and slim margins on intermodal 
business. Equipment has been another barrier to railroad intermodal 
growth. The railroads have difficulty in achieving satisfactory utilization 
statistics for their own trailers used in TOFC service. The rapid growth 
of trailer sizes has rendered much railroad intermodal equipment prema-
turely obsolete, further contributing to intermodal financial woes. With 
intermodal loads contributing $6 billion+ in annual revenues and 20 
percent of the total rail car loadings, the industry must find a more 
effective way to handle the business. 
Trucking companies, on the other hand, achieve relatively high fleet 
utilization, manage rapid fleet turnover to keep pace with technology, 
and market quality service. Yet motor carrier financial performance has 
been marginal for the past few years. Motor carrier bankruptcies hit 
record levels in 1990 and 1991. Profit margins have been razor thin, 
averaging about 1.6 percent during the period 1987-1991. 1991 revenues 
averaged $1.84/mile, down $0.05/mile from 1990. Driver shortages have 
been a severe problem in the industry, and increased highway conges-
tion, especially in urban areas, have impacted service standards. 
These relative pressures have no doubt influenced the creation of 
rail-motor carrier partnerships. While by no means common yet, these 
partnerships have received a great deal of attention because they involve 
major players in both industries. 
The oldest and best known rail-motor carrier intermodal partnership 
is the Quantum service established by J.B. Hunt and various railroads. 
J.B. Hunt, a large truckload carrier, has prospered since deregulation 
through a combination of aggressive marketing and premium service. In 
the Quantum operation, Hunt sought to develop partnerships with rail 
carriers to attract new truckload business and move it intermodally. 
Quantum was to be marketed as a seamless premium service. Hunt 
would perform the sales, pick up and delivery, and billing operations, 
with the rail partner providing the line haul. There was no third party or 
IMC involvement. 
Hunt's decision to establish Quantum was driven by the realization 
that motor carrier operations were no longer cost competitive with rail 
intermodal in long-haul corridors. The service started in 1990 with a 
midwest-California lane using the Santa Fe Railway. Quantum provided 
dedi_cated trailers for this service. Third-morning delivery time was a key 
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selling point. Since 1991, Hunt has expanded Quantum using five 
additional railroads CUP, BN, CR, SP, and CN) to serve all regions of the 
country except the southeast. There are rumors that Hunt is seeking a 
partner with which to enter this territory. The most recent partnership 
with Canadian National Railway allows Hunt access to the Canadian 
market. 
Has Quantum been successful? Industry sources indicate that the 
original midwest-California lane handled over 100,000 units in 1992. 
Further, the expansion seems to be an indication of financial viability. 
Quantum seems to have taught Hunt one interesting lesson. The com-
pany recently announced plans to replace its trailer fleet (17,000 units) 
with 24,000 intermodal containers and chassis. This decision was un-
doubtedly fostered by the potential economies offered by double stacking. 
In addition, Hunt developed a container family with the full 110" clear-
ance offered by conventional trailers, thus eliminating one shipper 
complaint about container equipment. Hunt reportedly has no plans to 
purchase further conventional trailers. 
Con-Way Intermodal (CWI) is a unit of Consolidated Freightways 
Corp., holding company for a major motor carrier. In 1991, CWI 
launched its Con-Quest premium intermodal service, again in conjunc-
tion with major railroads. Con-Quest is in an expansiqn phase, with the 
recent announcement of service to Memphis, Charlotte, and Columbus, 
Ohio, markets. CWI also is investing $4.9 million in chassis and contain-
ers. 
Schneider National is a third major player in the motor carrier 
industry that is entering the intermodal market. Schneider· started 
midwest-west lanes in 1991 using the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific 
railroads. The company is working with rail carriers to develop a larger 
network. 
Thus far, I have talked about partnerships between transportation 
providers. There is another type of partnership which is equally impor-
tant--the partnership between transportation users and providers. The 
emphasis on quality which is sweeping American industry is to a large 
degree responsible for these partnerships. 
During the 1980s, American business, under pressure from global 
competitors, rediscovered quality management philosophies. The lessons 
of Dr. Edward Deming had been a great influence on Japanese industry, 
helping it to achieve a worldwide reputation for superior quality. As 
American industry embraced quality management, the relationships 
between transportation companies and users began to change. 
Dr. Deming outlined 14 management steps as being essential to 
quality. The following points directly influenced carrier-user partner-
ships: 
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1. End the practice of awarding business based upon the price tag. 
Move towards a single supplier for any one item. Base this long-term 
relationship on loyalty and trust. (10) 
2. Improve constantly and forever the system of production and 
service. (11) 
3. Create constancy of purpose toward improvement of product and 
service to become competitive and to stay in business and to provide jobs. 
(14) 
A recent survey of top U.S. companies revealed that 70 percent had 
internal quality programs. Thirty percent of the companies required 
transportation providers to have a quality program, also. In this same 
survey, these companies awarded motor carriers a 74-percent score for 
quality verses a 36-percent score for railroads. 
Industry emphasis on quality has had a number of impacts on 
transportation. A University of Tennessee survey of the top 100 U.S. 
corporations revealed that companies are overwhelmingly reducing the 
number of transportation companies with which they do business. They 
are taking a serious look at the service offered by companies in addition 
to price. Successful providers must study their customers and take a 
proactive role in developing and maintaining service standards to en-
hance the customer business. In return, customers are bringing carriers 
into their planning process and allowing them to work hand-in-hand on 
long-range distribution planning projects. 
How does this affect intermodal providers? It is obvious that inter-
modal needs to achieve a reputation for quality service in addition to low 
cost. lntermodal service must be easy to use, reliable, and flexible. 
lntermodal companies must understand how their customers do business 
and make their services an integral part of the business. Given the 
potential business volume for intermodalism ($30-40 billion/year), the 
rewards for doing so are significant. As J.B. Hunt stated during the 1993 
Intermodal Expo, "The guy who does it best, with the highest quality and 
the lowest cost to the shipper will be the winner." 
The automobile industry is perhaps the best example of a shipper/ 
intermodal provider partnership. The major U.S. automobile manufac-
turers have been quick to embrace quality techniques, including "just-in-
time." Of course, the Japanese automobile manufacturers have brought a 
long tradition of quality to their new plants in the U.S. At any rate, the 
automobile industry has been ready intermodal customers. The Triple 
Crown Roadrailer and container service started by Norfolk Southern 
handles a sizable volume of auto parts business. Triple Crown, which 
works closely with the manufacturers, is a premium service which is 
owned by a railroad, but allowed to operate semi-autonomously with 
motor carrier oriented management. Automotive parts business report-
edly is a key component of the double-stack and premium TOFC offered 
by the companies already discussed herein. There are numerous reports 
in the trade press of the development of joint facilities at customer 
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locations, dedicated service lanes, and dedicated equipment to support 
partnerships between these intermodal users and providers. 
The final aspect of intermodal partnerships I would like to address 
involves partnerships between the public and private sectors. We in the 
public sector have a vested interest from a policy standpoint in promot-
ing intermodal transportation. 
-In many cases, intermodal transportation is the most rational and 
economic means of handling freight. It makes the best use of existing 
transportation infrastructure. 
· -Intermodalism helps to keep American industry competitive. 
-Intermodalism has positive environmental and safety impacts (10 
percent of the hydrocarbons and 33 percent of the NOx and COx of truck 
alone). 
-Intermodalism reduces the strain on congested highways and 
alleviates the need to build new facilities. 
The public sector/private sector partnership should, therefore, 
promote intermodal transportation. Public sector contributions to the 
partnership are as follows: 
-Resolving land use and zoning issues 
-Coordination of various public/private interests 
-Assessing traffic, environmental, and economic impacts 
-Promotion 
-Financial assistance 
-Infrastructure ownership and management 
Provision of intermodal terminal facilities has been a very visible 
part of the public/private intermodal partnership. Many port facilities 
are owned by government bodies. Port managers are actively enhancing 
intermodal connections so that their facilities can accommodate double-
stack service. Often this support extends beyond the port property. The 
Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, for example, are negotiating with 
the Southern Pacific Railroad to purchase an existing 20-mile-long 
railroad right-of-way for $275 million. They would construct a new joint 
access rail line and a dedicated truck road on this right-of-way to serve 
container port facilities. The Port of San Francisco agreed to pay for $11 
million in tunnel clearance improvements on a Southern Pacific rail line 
serving its port area. This would allow double stack access to the port. 
Massachusetts authorities plan to fund an extensive railroad clearance 
improvement program to allow double-stack access to Boston terminals. 
Virginia has constructed an inland container facility near Port Royal. 
Trucks would deliver containers here for forwarding via rail service to 
the Norfolk container port. 
It is interesting to me that most of these partnerships involve gov-
ernment at a local level teaming with a carrier or company. The project 
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typically has an economic impact on the local area--keep a port competi-
tive or help a key industry. Promotion of intermodalism as an integral 
part . of a balanced, rational transportation system is not the overall goal 
in these situations. The state initiatives to upgrade rail clearances 
represent opportunities to develop an overall intermodal transportation 
plan, but, to date, these still seem oriented towards maintaining the 
competitiveness of ports. Only when these projects are promoted in the 
context of a domestically oriented intermodal service will the true 
potential of intermodalism be realized. Perhaps ISTEA will shape think-
ing in this regard. 
I've tried to give some overall perspective to intennodal transporta-
tion as I see it. I hope that my talk has been of some help in identifying 
key issues and opportunities in intennodal partnerships. 
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